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Article 4

Democracy and Legitimation:
A Response to Professor Guinier
Louis Michael Seidman
I am a big fan of Lani Guinier. I admire her courage, envy her
articulateness, and share her outrage. I make this point at the beginning
of this response because I hope that it will put into context my criticisms
of her paper. But, I do have criticisms. 1In this paper, at least, I believe
that she is headed in the wrong direction.
In order to see the problem with Professor Guinier's position, we
need to start by focusing on some basic facts. According to the United
States Census Bureau, as of 2000, the poorest 20% of the population
received 3.6% of the nation's income, while the highest 20% received
49.7%. 2 The Congressional Budget Office tells us that between 1979
and 1997, the average income for Americans in the top 20% went up by
3
50%, while the average income for the bottom 20% went down by 4%. 4
The latest census shows that 31.1 million Americans are poor.
Specifically, over one in five African-Americans, almost one in four
households headed by a female, and 16.2% of all children are below the
poverty line. 5 According to the Department of Agriculture, over 10% of

*

This response to Professor Guinier's essay, Supreme Democracy: Bush v. Gore Redux, 34

Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 23 (2002), was written after seeing a draft of Part IV of her article, "Response
to Criticism of this Essay." Professor Guinier has since revised Part IV of her article, and I did
not have an opportunity to address those revisions.
** Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. These remarks, like Professor
Guinier's, were originally delivered orally. I have followed her lead in retaining their informal
character. My thanks to Mark Tushnet for providing comments on an earlier version of this
response.
1. See Lani Guinier, Supreme Democracy: Bush v. Gore Redux, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 23
(2002).
2. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MONEY INCOME IN THE UNITED STATES: 2000, at 7 (2001),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/200 1pubs/p60-213.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2002).
3. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HISTORICAL EFFECTIVE TAX RATES 1979-1997, at 5 (prelim. ed.
2001), available at ftp://ftp.cbo.gov/28xx/doc2838/historicaltaxrates.pdf (last visited Nov. 25,
2002).
4. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2000, at 1 (2001), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2001 pubs/p60-214.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2002).
5. See id. at 2.
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American households do not always have enough food to eat. 6 We
could spend a long time arguing about the causes and cures for these
facts. Whatever the causes and whatever the cures, surely the American
people would not casually and unthinkingly accept this obscenity unless
there were complex and powerful legitimating structures in place
allowing them to distance themselves from it.
What are the legitimating structures? There are four that seem
especially significant. First, Professor Guinier rightly focuses on the
belief in meritocracy. 7 For our purposes, we might define a believer in
meritocracy as someone who thinks that, in a given society, people get
more or less what they deserve. Hence, if there are people in our
society who are poor or hungry, powerless or on the streets, they are in
these predicaments because of something that they did or failed to do.
In short, they are there because they deserve to be there.
I have no quarrel with Professor Guinier's attack on meritocracy as a
legitimating structure. Indeed, if there is a single position that identifies
the progressive tradition-or at least that part of the progressive
tradition that I like to associate myself with-it is an insistence on the
contingency of the distribution of power and property. Belief in
meritocracy is wrong because it obscures the arbitrariness of the
standards of "merit" that determine distributions and because it dulls
our sense of moral outrage at the suffering of the many for the benefit of
the few.
The belief in meritocracy is a powerful force in our culture, but it
could not bear the weight that our current circumstances put upon it
without the support of two other legitimating structures that have
special appeal to elites. First, a commitment to economic efficiency
supports the status quo. Unlike believers in meritocracy, people who
defend the efficiency hypothesis will sometimes concede that markets
operate unfairly-that is, when they are willing to concede that the
concept of fairness has any analytic content at all. Nonetheless, they
insist on the inevitability of market distributions on the ground that any
effort to redistribute or regulate will result in a reduction in incentives
and destruction of gains from trade, thereby making the total pie
smaller. 8 The efficiency argument has less emotive power than the

6. See ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FOOD SECURITY IN THE UNITED
STATES, at http://ers.usda.gov/briefing/FoodSecurity (last modified Nov. 13, 2002).
7. See Guinier, supra note 1, at 44-50.
8. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV.
961, 966 (2001) (arguing that "when the choice of legal rules is based even in part on notions of
fairness, individuals tend to be made worse off'); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal
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argument from meritocracy, and it therefore appears only occasionally
in what popular discussion there is about the maldistribution of wealth.
It is, however, the legitimating structure of choice for the pseudosophisticates of the right who, among their many recent triumphs, have
made efficiency talk into something approaching the lingua franca of
American legal education. 9
Closely tied to the efficiency argument is the second elite
legitimating structure-the rhetoric of impotence. Here, the claim is
that economic maldistribution is a complex and difficult problem
understood only by experts. According to this view, the absurd notion
that what makes people poor is the absence of money, and that poverty
might be alleviated by the provision of money, deserves nothing but
contempt.' 0 Instead, it is claimed, the problem is tied to broad societal,
economic, and cultural forces over which we have little or no control.
Efforts to deal with it are bound to have unintended and
counterproductive consequences, and people who think otherwise are
unrepentant and unwashed radicals whose views are not worthy of
serious consideration.
Each of these legitimating structures helps to support the status quo,
but even taken together, they cannot do the job alone. There is a fourth
structure that is even more powerful than the other three, because it has
both mass and elite appeal that extends across the political spectrum.
Indeed, it is so powerful that it seems to have taken in Professor
Guinier. I am referring to the belief in democracy.
When democratic rhetoric is deployed to support the status quo, the
claim is that the current distribution of power and wealth is justified
because it is produced by a political process that is open to all. Thus,
even if some people think that these outcomes are substantively unfair,
it is nonetheless arrogant and elitist to insist that their substantive views
should prevail. In a culture with widely divergent substantive views,
the only fair way to resolve disputes is through democracy. Conversely,
if a dispute has been resolved democratically, mere substantive
disagreement with the outcome does not justify resistance.

System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667
(1994) (arguing that legal rules are an inefficient method of distributing wealth).
9. See Keith Aoka, Introduction:Language Is a Virus, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 961, 966 (1999)
(characterizing the "'language' of law and economics" as "the lingua franca of vast stretches of
legal academia").
10. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT: THE SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS OF
CITIZENSHIP 65 (1986) (arguing that "a benefit-oriented social policy might after a point produce
more poverty rather than less, because of the behavioral changes it would induce").
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At first, it may seem paradoxical to link Professor Guinier to this
structure of legitimation. After all, isn't she claiming that current
distributions of wealth and power are illegitimate precisely because they
have been achieved undemocratically?" In fact, however, Professor
Guinier, like democratic apologists for the status quo, links legitimacy
to democracy. 12 Her position suggests that if only outcomes were
produced by a truly democratic process, then they would be
legitimate.' 3 Put differently, her complaint seems to be not that millions
of children go to bed hungry, that endless resources are wasted on a
bloated defense establishment, or that there are huge differences
between the kinds of lives that Americans of different social classes can
expect to live. No, the problem is that we do not have proportional
representation, that somehow we are aggregating votes in the wrong
will, and that
way, that the two-party system fails to reflect the national
14
machines.
voting
of
kind
wrong
the
Florida is using
I say that her paper "suggests" this interpretation, but I must add that
there are two crucial ambiguities in her position. First, perhaps
Professor Guinier is claiming that democracy is a necessary but
insufficient condition for political legitimacy. 15 There is no logical
problem in believing both that our system is illegitimate because it is
undemocratic and that, even if it were democratic, it would still be
illegitimate so long as it produced severe maldistributions of wealth and
power. But although this position is not illogical, neither is it very
helpful if it turns out that we must choose between democracy and
distributive justice. For reasons set forth below, I believe that we may
well face this choice. If I am right, then an insistence that democracy is
necessary will, as a practical matter, also make it sufficient.
Moreover, even if we don't face this choice in a pure form, we must
still decide whether to focus limited political energy on issues of
democratic self-governance or on issues of substantive distributions.
By focusing on procedure, however, we risk becoming distracted from
more important issues of substance. We must also be concerned that,
through a kind of rhetorical slippage, the claim that our system is
illegitimate because undemocratic will be translated into the logically
distinct but easily confused assertion that once made democratic, the
system thereby becomes legitimate. A reader of Professor Guinier's

11. Guinier, supra note 1, at 25-28.
12. Id. at 51-58.
13. Id. at 58--64.
14. Id. at 51-64.
15. Id. at 70-71.
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essay might well ask why she is willing to expend so much energy to
reform putatively undemocratic structures if this reform, once achieved,
would still leave the system fundamentally flawed. The reader might be
forgiven for inferring from this willingness that Professor Guinier
believes that her reforms would accomplish something really important,
and that the problems left untouched by the reforms are therefore
relatively unimportant.
The issue of tactics leads to a second, closely related, ambiguity in
Professor Guinier's position. It is unclear whether she really believes in
democracy as a matter of deep principle, or whether her position is only
tactical. The way to test which view she holds is to ask whether she
would still favor democracy if it resulted in a substantive outcome that
she abhors-if, for example, it served to entrench rather than destabilize
a deeply unjust social order. I must confess that I am not sure what
answer Professor Guinier would give to this question. On the one hand,
Professor Guinier insists that democracy is not "a tactic to achieve
particular substantive ends, but ...an end in itself." 16 Yet on the other
hand, her paper is studded with references to the likely success of a
"broad, multiracial and progressive coalition"' 17 that, she believes,
would emerge if only we adopted truly democratic procedures. Toward
the end of her paper, she claims that her "vision of democracy will,
[she] hope[s], result in the substantive social justice that [we] both
worry about."
By relying on this "hope," Professor Guinier manages
to slide off the hard question of whether her belief in democracy trumps
her belief in social justice. Because I am authentically uncertain which
position she holds, I will address each in turn.
Suppose that Professor Guinier is adopting only the rhetoric of
democracy in order to achieve a set of substantive ends that is
conceptually independent from democratic governance, and that she
would abandon democracy as soon as it conflicted with her version of
social justice. Instrumental arguments for democracy make some sense
if, in fact, they are likely to achieve those ends. There are nonetheless
two objections to the instrumental position. First, it is disingenuous. As
noted above, Professor Guinier sometimes presents her position as a
matter of principle that transcends disagreement about social policy. If
her democracy rhetoric is, nonetheless, merely a tactic for putting into
power a "progressive coalition," then that part of her audience that does
not favor such a coalition deserves to be told so. Put differently,
16. Id. at 64.
17. Id. at 53.
18. Id. at 72.
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Professor Guinier's substantive proposals should be debated on their
own merits. It is deeply misleading to pretend that opposition to these
substantive claims is rooted in disregard for transsubstantive,
foundational principles of political fairness.
Second, even if one puts aside qualms about candor, the trouble with
the instrumental use of democracy rhetoric is that it is unlikely to work.
This tactic has a long pedigree, and its history should give us pause.
For decades, the feminist movement was organized around the battle for
the right to vote. It was thought that if only women could exercise the
franchise, our politics and culture would be transformed. Of course,
equal suffrage is a worthy goal on its own terms, but the fact remains
that the Nineteenth Amendment left our politics mostly unchanged, and
its passage turned out to be a disaster for the feminist movement. By
cleverly giving women what they were demanding, men successfully19
delayed real movement toward gender equality for two generations.
Similarly, passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, removing formal legal
obstacles to the right to vote, did virtually nothing to change the status
The result produced by the 1965 Civil
of African-American citizens.
Rights Act is more ambiguous, but I don't think that any sensible person
believes that it has produced the racial transformation that its advocates
had hoped for. Although some progress has been made, it is sheer myth
the extension of the franchise has ended black
to suppose 2 that
1
subjugation.
Given this sorry history, why should anyone suppose that Professor
Guinier's version of democratic revival would fare any better? The
argument that democratization will produce progressive, substantive
outcomes rests on a large non sequitur. Suppose it is true that our
current political structures fail to represent fairly the interests of certain
groups. It simply does not follow that these groups would be thrust into
power if only they were fairly represented. On the contrary, it is
entirely possible-indeed likely-that these groups would be outvoted
under a wide variety of different structures designed to aggregate
19.

See JAMES MACGREGAR BURNS & STEWART BURNS,

A PEOPLE'S CHARTER: THE

PURSUIT OF RIGHTS IN AMERICA 170 (1991) (arguing that passage of the Nineteenth Amendment

"resulted in little concrete change in most women's lives" and "led to the collapse of the woman's
movement as a collective force").
20. In the immediate wake of Reconstruction, African-American people voted in large
numbers. However, by the 1890s, southern states had adopted measures like literacy tests and
poll taxes that effectively replaced the formal ante bellum barriers to African-American voting.
See Michael J. Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998 SUP. CT. REv. 303, 308 (1998).
21. Professor Guinier herself has been in the forefront of those who have exposed the myth.
See Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black

Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077 (1991).
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preferences. Sadly, American leftists never seem to learn that our
politics are played on a very small margin. A large segment of the
electorate is fundamentally conservative and complacent, sanctimonious
and satisfied.
Although there are many poor people, they are
nonetheless a minority, and for so long as they remain distantgeographically, culturally, and empathically-from suburban soccer
moms, no amount of tinkering with the forms of democracy is likely to
achieve social justice. Even if everyone had an equal voice in
determining political outcomes, the legitimating structures I have
already mentioned make it unlikely that these facts will change any time
soon. The fundamental problem, then, is not with counting votes, but
with changing minds.
Of course, these concerns have no force if Professor Guinier is not
making an instrumental argument and, as noted above, Professor
Guinier sometimes seems to reject the instrumental approach. 22 If we
are to take these protestations seriously, then she must believe that
democracy is a necessary condition for political legitimacy even when it
leads to the defeat of the policies she favors. That is, after all, what it
means to believe in democracy on principled grounds. But why should
anyone hold this belief? Why should we be willing to trade off
substantive justice for procedural justice?
It is important here to dispel two misunderstandings that confuse the
debate between democrats and their critics. First, there is a difference
between a commitment to democracy and a commitment to political
organizing. I share Professor Guinier's admiration for the United Farm
Workers' ("UFW") organizing efforts in the 1960s and 1970s." She is
right to insist that "bottom-up" organizing is often superior to the "topdown" version. 24 Still, as someone who claims to value the "superior
wisdom" of those without "book learning, ' 25 she might have paid more
attention to what the UFW chose to organize about. At least as I
remember it,the workers themselves did not organize around the
intricacies of democratic theory. Instead, they raised substantive issues
of social justice---decent working conditions, reasonable pay, and the
fundamental right to self-respect.2 6 If I understand her correctly,
22. See Guinier, supra note 1,at 64 (arguing that democracy is not "a tactic to achieve
particular substantive ends, but... an end in itself').
23. Id. at 71-73.
24. Id. at 71.
25. Id. at 68.
26. My recollection is confirmed by Professor Guimer's colleague, Charles Ogletree, who
points out that Cesar Chavez "fought for higher wages, for adequate living conditions, for safe
transport to and from the fields, and for the right to bargain collectively." Charles J. Ogletree, Jr.,
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Professor Guinier thinks that this choice was a large mistake. Instead of
following the UFW's example today, she would have us use our limited
political resources to promote a procedural agenda that Cesar Chavez
could not have cared less about.
This leads to a second confusion: skepticism about democracy is not
the same thing as an arrogant refusal to think seriously about arguments
offered by others. It is therefore simply not the case, as Professor
Guinier asserts, that the difference between us is that she alone doesn't
"know in advance what the most just outcome is in all situations or how
to achieve it," 27 and that she alone believes that "the people themselves
have superior wisdom in so many ways to those of us who have superior
book learning." 2 8 I must confess to some skepticism that, at this stage
in her career, Professor Guinier is likely to soon change her mind about
"what the most just outcome is" after a conversation with, say, a blue
collar Reagan conservative lacking in "superior book learning." On the
contrary, as I understand her, she is quite prepared to discount the views
of "working-class whites [who] support a conservative political
agenda," as she once expressly stated, 29 apparently because people of
this sort don't belong to unions.30 But if I am wrong about this-if she
is in fact as commendably open-minded as she claims-this trait has
nothing to do with a commitment to democracy. Of course, before one
forms an opinion, one should listen to the argument on the other side.
Of course, even after the opinion is initially formed, one should remain
as open as possible to subsequent revision of one's views. And of
course, if many people reach a different judgment, that fact alone
provides a good reason to reconsider one's own opinion.
There nonetheless comes a point when all these factors have been
considered and given appropriate weight and when the time to act has
finally arrived. The question Professor Guinier fails to answer is why at
this crucial moment of decision, one should subordinate one's own
deeply held all-things-considered beliefs about political justice to
majority preferences. There are serious people who have thought that
we should do so, but Cesar Chavez was not among them. Neither were

The Quiet Storm: The Rebellious Influence of Cesar Chavez, 1 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 7
(1994). Professor Ogletree provides no support for the proposition that either Chavez or the
movement that he led ever became enmeshed in the intricacies of democratic theory.
27. Guinier, supra note 1, at 68.
28. Id.
29. In an earlier draft, Professor Guinier made this statement, which has since been removed
through the editing process. (Unpublished draft on file with Loyola University Chicago Law
Journal.)
30. See Guinier, supra note 1, at 51-54.
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Martin Luther King, Mahatma Gandhi, or Henry David Thoreau. Does
Professor Guinier really want to place herself on the other side of this
argument?
This Essay is not the place for a full-blown discussion of democratic
theory. Indeed, part of my position is that in our present circumstances
such a discussion is deeply beside the point. Still, it is worth examining
the difficulty that Professor Guinier's argument for a foundational
commitment to democracy gets her into. The difficulty begins with the
brute fact that in contemporary political discourse there is reasonable
disagreement about what precisely democracy entails.
Professor
Guinier offers a powerful argument for a particular conception of
democracy, but we need to understand that her conception is contested.
Perhaps regrettably, not everyone agrees that her particular version of
proportional representation would make our system more democratic.
No one has an uncontroversial solution to Condorcet's Paradox, 3 1 to
cycling problems, to putting in place the necessary preconditions for
democracy, or to the difficulty of measuring the intensity of preference.
If we treat democracy as foundational, this disagreement leads to a
vicious circle.
Democratic theorists might be expected to favor
democracy as the means by which these disagreements about
democratic theory could be resolved. Thus, we should not be surprised
when Professor Guinier, the good democratic theorist that she is,
laments the constitutionalization of democracy. For example, she
32
attacks Bush
33 v. Gore as being a judicial interference with democratic
processes. Similarly, she decries the tendency of some progressives to
rely upon the Supreme Court to achieve social change. 34 As a
democrat, Professor Guinier understands that her commitments must be
put to a democratic test and should not be imposed by judicial fiat.
But there is an obvious difficulty with using democratic processes to
define what democratic processes amount to. I stand second to no one
35
in my disgust and dismay at the Court's performance in Bush v. Gore,
but one does have to understand that the majority's self-conception was
that it was enforcing, rather than undermining, democratic principles.

31. Condorcet's Paradox holds that when there are three or more parties, each with wellordered preferences, faced with three or more policy choices, no single choice may be the choice
of a majority. For a good explanation, see JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND
GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 12-13 (1997).
32. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
33. Guinier, supra note 1, at 24.
34. Id. at 68-70.
35. See Louis Michael Seidman, What's So Bad about Bush v. Gore? An Essay on Our
Unsettled Election, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 953 (2001).
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Thus, the conflict between the Bush Court and its critics is not a conflict
about whether we should have democracy, but about what democracy
means. It should be clear that attempting to resolve this conflict through
democratic processes leads to a circle. In order to resolve these
disagreements democratically, we would have to have already settled
the very disagreement we are trying to resolve.
The only way to avoid this circle is to admit what Professor Guinier
wants to deny-that democracy cannot be foundational. Put differently,
we cannot rely on democratic processes to put in place and legitimate a
particular instantiation of democracy. Professor Guinier seems to have
an inkling of this as well. Hence, she criticizes the Supreme Court for
failing to intervene in cases where it has refused to order third-party
participation in debates or where it has not invalidated political
gerrymandering. 36 Her attack makes sense if one thinks, as I have
argued, that we cannot rely on democracy to put democracy in place.
But Professor Guinier should not attempt to have it both ways. She
cannot both attack the "constitutionalization of democracy" 37 and then
attack the Court for failing to constitutionalize democracy. She wants
to have it both ways, because otherwise it will become obvious that, by
insisting on her particular version of democracy, she, like those she
criticizes, is trying to resolve a legitimate disagreement by fiat.
This problem, in turn, leads to a second series of contradictions.
Suppose that we concede for the sake of argument that Professor
Guinier's particular version of democracy is the "right" version. Of
course, her complaint is that this version is not presently in place in the
United States and, because it is not in place, the current political process
does not provide people with a fair opportunity to have their views
reflected in public policy. Why would anyone who believes this
suppose that such an unfair system, stacked against the disadvantaged,
could reform itself? If the system is as undemocratic as Professor
Guinier believes, does it not follow that this unfairness will be reflected
in resistance to the change she demands? Put the other way around, if
the kind of grassroots political actions that Professor Guinier favors
would indeed be successful, would not this success demonstrate that the
system as currently constituted is more democratic than she allows?
In fact, I think it is foolish to suppose that this country is on the verge
of a fundamental rethinking of our political system. There is not going

36. Guinier, supra note 1, at 32-33, 41-44.
37. Id. at 24 (citing Richard Pildes, Constitutionalizing Democratic Politics, in A BADLY
FLAWED ELECTION: DEBATING BUSH V. GORE, THE SUPREME COURT,
DEMOCRACY 155 (Ronald Dworkin ed., 2002)).

AND

AMERICAN
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to be proportional representation. There are not going to be viable third
and fourth parties that drive the Democrats to the left, and if there are,
the only result will be to further entrench a conservative, Republican
plurality. There is not going to be a large mass movement demanding
popular democracy of the sort that Professor Guinier envisions.
Optimism is great, but we need to face the facts, and the facts are that
we may well end up with conservative Republican presidents for as far
as the eye can see.
Of course, there are also serious difficulties in using the present
system to implement a redistributive substantive agenda. But at least
efforts to accomplish this goal are directed at changing people's minds
in a way that would actually matter. In contrast, Professor Guinier's
strategy depends on a sort of indirection that is too clever by half. In
progressive circles, one endlessly hears a lament that goes something
like this: "If only we had real campaign finance reform, then we could
get Congress to pass X." This observation is a little like saying, "if only
there were not gravity, then we could fly." It is always a mistake to
suppose that our opponents are stupid. People who do not want X will
block authentic campaign finance reform precisely because they know
that if it were enacted, it would lead to the passage of X. Conversely, if
we had the votes to pass campaign finance reform, we would not need
to do so because then we would already have the votes to pass X.
I do not want to accuse Professor Guinier of falling into the
democracy trap, only to fall into the impotence trap myself. It is
important, therefore, to recognize that even though we are operating in a
very unfavorable political environment, there are things that can be
done. But the main thing that has to be done is changing people's views
about X, not passing campaign finance reform. I have two specific
suggestions about how we might go about doing this.
First, I agree with Professor Guinier that the dispossessed should be
empowered to choose their own destinies. 38 For just this reason,
however, it seems foolish to try to organize those left out of American
society around arcane issues like proportional representation. As Cesar
Chavez understood, people with nothing lack the luxury of debating
process. They want to talk about what really matters, and what really
matters is substantive outcomes. I had thought that after a long
struggle, the American intellectual left had finally freed itself from the
trap of process. It is therefore dismaying to see Professor Guinier go

38.

Id. at 70-71.
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over the same tired
ground that people like John Hart Ely wore out a
39
ago.
generation
Second, in this environment, preaching to the choir with rhetoric that
convinces only those who need no convincing is the height of selfindulgence. The few victories that are to be had require painful,
sometimes unprincipled, compromise, postponing demands that cannot
in justice be postponed, and carefully constructing coalitions with
partners we secretly detest.
Perhaps, too, we need to secretly detest fewer partners. Building
coalitions among people of color or among the dispossessed of all
colors is fine, but these coalitions are unlikely to be large enough to
accomplish what needs to be done. If we are to expand beyond these
groups, we must in fact do what, I'm afraid, Professor Guinier only
pretends to do. We must be authentically open to changing our own
minds even as we try to change the minds of others. For example, we
simply cannot afford to dismiss the views of politically conservative
blue-collar workers on the grounds that they are not unionized. We
need, instead, the moral imagination to understand why someone might
believe that these views are right. We need to cultivate the ability to
understand that our opponents are neither idiots nor moral monsters and
to see how it could be possible that someone who is not an idiot or a
moral monster can end up being our opponent. And yes, perhaps we
even need to tone down some of the rhetoric about legitimating
structures with which this Essay begins.
We need to do all these things because, in the end, we can only
expect to be taken seriously by others if we take them seriously as well.
No one said that this would be easy or fun, but it is possible. Changing
minds is hard, but it can be done if we approach the task with the
openness and discipline, focus and humility, that the task requires.
There is no hope that it can be done if we expend our energy worrying
about counting votes rather than changing minds. As things stand now,
we do not have the votes however they are counted. My hope, then, is
that Professor Guinier will change her mind and use her considerable
talents to help change the minds of others.

39. Professor Ely is famous for his effort to reduce many substantive constitutional principles
to controversies about democratic processes. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).

